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Bruce Ackerman on Interpretation: A Critique 
Raoul Berger 
The too familiar vice of the present age is to obtrude as  mani- 
fest truths, mere fancies, born of conjecture and superficial 
reasoning, altogether unsupported by the testimony of sense. 
William Harvey* 
Bruce Ackerman's We the People1 has been hailed by San- 
ford Levinson as "[tlhe most important project now underway 
in the entire field of constitutional the~ry."~ Ackerman tells us 
that it has been his "principal preoccupation" during the 
1980s.~ Throughout those years he "steadfastly tried to  reserve 
every morning for uninterrupted reading and writing? setting 
out on a voyage "[tlo discover the Constitution"'-theretofore 
presumably terra incognita? The mountain labored and 
brought forth, according to Levinson: "a complex process of 
'publian politics' where 'We the People' became authorized to 
change the Constitution without even invoking the procedures 
* Quoted in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 367 (1983). 
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
2. Sanford Levinson, Dust Jacket to id. 
3. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at  ix. 
4. Id. 
5. I d . a t 3 .  
6. Terrance Sandalow regards it as  "unfortunate" that Ackerman's rhetoric is 
"inflated, self-important, and self-congratulatory." Terrance Sandalow, Abstract De- 
mocracy A Review of Acbrman's We the People, 9 C o ~ s r .  COMMENTARY 309, 309 
(1992). 
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laid out in Article V."? To nullify Article V calls for more than 
the lucubrations of a closet phil~sopher.~ Ackerman's "discov- 
ery" masks the fact that the Court, not the people, changed the 
Constitution: and thus it merely rationalizes judicial revision- 
ism. At no time, wrote Leonard Levy, "have the American peo- 
ple passed judgment, pro or con, on the merits of judicial re- 
view over Congress [let alone judicial alteration of the Consti- 
7. Levinson, supra note 2. Hobbes wrote, "The authority of writers, without 
the authority of the commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law." THOMAS 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 146 (1943). Judge Easterbrook observes that behind 
Ackerman's argument "is the belief that Something Big happened in 1933-53: an 
unwritten amendment to the Constitution incorporating the New Deal and autho- 
rizing a great enlargement of federal power. I confess to doubting the equivalence 
of written and unwritten amendments to the Constitution . . . . If the document 
no longer binds us in some respects, why does it govern in others?" Frank H. 
Easterbrook, k v e l s  of Generality in Constitutional Interpretation: Abstraction and 
Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 368 (1992). 
Suzanna Sherry states of Ackerman's theory (that the people revised Article V) 
that his "historical evidence completely fails to demonstrate this." S u z a ~ a  Sherry, 
The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARv. L. REV. 918, 928 (1992) (book review). 
She criticizes his "exclusion of the massive historical evidence from the Philadel- 
phia Convention, the ratlfymg conventions," etc., and states that his "decision to 
ignore it makes for poor history indeed." Id. at  924. 
8. Sandalow justly finds it "doubtful that the People made, or can be shown to 
have made, the decisions he attributes to them." Sandalow, supra note 6, at  329. 
Under Ackerman's theory, says Sandalow, "responsibility for determining the shape 
and direction of constitutional law does not rest with the People . . . but with the 
Justices." Id. at 331. Ackerman's "contention that the Court is merely pursuing a 
course set by the People seems implausible." Id. "[Iln Ackerman's 'dualist democ- 
racy' it is the Justices, not the People, who make the crucial constitutional deci- 
sions." Id. at 335. In short, the Court "has emerged as a major policymaking insti- 
tution, exercising power that the framers would not have recognized as being 'of a 
Judiciary Nature.' " Id. at  3 10 (citation omitted). 
9. Such judicial revisionism "cannot be accounted for by the mechanisms of 
change provided by the Constitutionn-i.e., the amendment process of Article V. Id. 
at  310. To do Sandalow justice, he considers that these departures "are now so 
deeply embedded in our 'working constitution' that it may seem quixotic to raise 
questions about their legitimacy." Id. at 312. By such reasoning, larceny may be 
legitimated if repeated often enough. 
But in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892), the Court rejected the 
notion that the Constitution may be "amended by judicial decision without action 
by the designated organs in the mode by which alone amendments can be made." 
And in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938), the Court speaking by Jus- 
tice Brandeis, who quoted Justice Holmes, branded SwiR v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 1 (1842), " 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United 
States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesi- 
tate to correct." 
Finally, both Sandalow and Ackerman "emphasize that the absence of a satis- 
factory theory-one that recognizes and justifies the realities of constitutional 
change [by the Court]--has a corrosive effect on the commitment to 
constitutionalism." Sandalow, supra note 6, at 312. 
ACKERMAN ON INTERPRETATION 
tution]. Consent freely given, by referendum, by legislation, or 
by amendment is simply not the same as  failure to abolish or 
impair."1° There is no provision for amendment by inertia. 
Activist justifications of the Court's "exercise of the amend- 
ing power"" are nothing new.12 What is new is Ackerman's 
argument that this was done at the behest of the people.13 No- 
where, of course, has the Court intimated that it was carrying 
out the mandate of the people in spite of the Constitution.14 
Hamilton cautioned that "[ulntil the people have, by some sol- 
emn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established 
form, i t  is binding upon themselves . . . and no presumption, or 
even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their repre- 
sentatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act."15 But 
times have changed. The late Robert Cover of Yale thrust aside 
"the self-evident meaning of the Constitution" because "we" 
have decided to "entrust" judges [where?] with framing a n  
"ideology" whereby legislation may be measured,16 and, it  may 
10. Leonard W. Levy, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, 
in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SCJPREME COURT 1, 31 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1967). 
11. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
12. There is a sea of "defenses" of judicial revisionism. For citations, see Raoul 
Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The. Activist Flight from the Constitution, 
47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 n.8 (1986). For example, Levy declared that the "Court is 
and must be for all practical purposes a 'continuous constitutional convention' in 
the sense that it must keep updating the original charter by reinterpretation." 
LEONARD W. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 23, 29-30 (1974). Justice Black, however, 
derided "rhapsodical strains about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution 
in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from 
time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those chang- 
es . . . . The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it" 
by the amendment process of Article V. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
13. In a penetrating review of Ackerman's opus, Stephen Presser notes 
Ackerman's claims that "[c]onstitutional change flows from the people and not the 
court, even when the change is accomplished by such decisions as Brown, Miranda 
and Roe" and that the Warren and Burger courts were working out the details of 
a change in rights that essentially had been ordered by the people themselves." 
Stephen Presser, Locking in Liberalism, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1991, $ 14, at  5. For 
another adverse review, see Sherry, supra note 7. 
14. To the contrary, in a letter to President Roosevelt, Professor Fraddbrter 
indicated that the Court repeatedly told the people that when it spoke, "it is not 
they who speak but the Constitution." Letter from Felix Franf i r te r  to Franklin 
Roosevelt (Feb. 18, 1937), in ROOSEVELT AND F R A N ~ R T E R :  THEIR CORRESPON- 
DENCE, 1928-1945, a t  383 (Max Freedman ed., 1967). 
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at  509 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library 
1937). 
16. Robert M. Cover, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27 
(reviewing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION F 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977)). Ackerman puts it more delicately: the New 
1038 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
be added, the Framers' choices jettisoned. 
Ackerman attributes this momentous change to the people 
themselves. Consider Brown u. Board of  ducati ion," which 
worked a revolution-the overthrow of segregation. "[Olnly a 
mobilized mass movement," writes Ackerman, "might encour- 
age progressive Democrats and Republicans to overcome mas- 
sive Southern resistance to new civil rights legislation. At the 
time Brown was argued and reargued . . . such a mass move- 
ment did not exist."18 In other words, Brown "did not come at  
[a] moment[] when a mobilized citizenry was demanding a fun- 
damental change in our fundamental law."19 The "real signifi- 
cance" of Brown et al., Ackerman opines, "lie[s] elsewhere, in 
the Court's courage in confronting modern Americans with a 
moral and political agenda that calls upon them to heed the 
voices of their better selves."2o Brown therefore presented the 
people with a virtually irreversible fait accompli rather than a 
response to popular demand. I t  came to achieve "retroactive 
Deal "began to build new constitutional foundations for activist national govern- 
ment." ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at  49. "The Constitution . . . is an evolving his- 
torical practice, constituted by generations of Americans as they mobilized." Id. at  
34. On the other hand, Justice Story, a fervent nationalist, wrote that the Consti- 
tution "is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction[,] . . . not dependent 
upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, [today], . 
and [forever]." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTIT~JTION F THE UNIT- 
ED STATES $ 426, at 410 (1st ed. 1833). 
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
18. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, a t  135. Benjamin Hooks, Executive Director of the 
NAACP said, " 'I don't think America was ready to end segregation[;] I don't think 
it has ever been ready to extend full equality.' " Peter Applebome, Rights Move- 
ment in Struggle for an Image as Well as a Bill, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1991, at  Al. 
19. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at  133. 
20. Id. Sidney Hook decried those "who know what the basic human needs. . . 
should be, who know not only what these needs are but what they require better 
than those who have them or should have them." SIDNEY HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND 
RJRLIC POLICY 28 (1980). "It is arrogant," he adds, to assume that "some self-se- 
lected elite can better determine what the best interests of other citizens are than 
those citizens themselves." Id. at 29. Lord Aman, then Vice-chancellor of the Uni- 
versity of London, rejected the theory that governments 
can identify what people would realty want were they enlightened . . . 
and understood fully what was needed to promote a good, just and satis- 
fying society. For if it is true that this can be identified then surely the 
state is justified in ignoring what ordinary people say they desire or 
detest. 
NOEL ANNAN, INTRODUCTION TO ISAIAH BERLIN, PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS at xiii, xvii 
(1981). Compare Justice Brennan's insistence that death penalties are contrary to 
"human dignity" despite his recognition that the people remain attached to them. 
Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan us. the Constitution, 29 B.C. L. REV. 787, 796-98 
(1988). 
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canonization," Ackerman states, by virtue of the "Civil Rights 
Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'"' 
But these acts premised that Brown was rooted in the Consti- 
tution, whereas Ackerman himself recognizes that Brown's 
constitutional authority is dubi~us.~%ence he is driven to 
assert that Brown possesses "the kind of numinous legal au- 
thority that is . . . uniquely associated with legal documents 
that express the considered judgments of We the Pe~ple."'~ 
The people, however, justifiably assumed that when the Court 
outlawed segregation its decision was mandated by the Consti- 
tution rather than by Warren's personal  predilection^.'^ Sub- 
sequent legislation could not legitimate the Court's disregard of 
Article V's provisions for amendment of the Constitution. Nei- 
ther the ringing admonitions of Washington,z5 Hamilt~n,'~ 
21. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at  137. 
22. Ackerman notes that Herbert Wechsler, a "leading legal scholar," "could not 
find a principled way to just@ Brown." Id. at  144. "[Elven Brown's defenders had 
to move far beyond Warren's feeble effort to justify the ways of the Court to 
thoughtful lawyers." Id. For a collection of the historical data which demonstrate 
that the Framers excluded segregation from the ambit of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JZJDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION F 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 117-33 (1977). Michael Perry listed examples of 
"commentary generally accepting Berger's history" and some "generally effective 
rebuttals by Berger to criticisms of his history." Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism, 
Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 285 n.100 
(1981). Perry concluded that the Framers did not intend to prohibit segregated 
schooling or to enjoin laws establishing racial segregation. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91-92 (1982). 
For citations accepting my historical findings, see Raoul Berger, Lawyering us. 
Philosophizing: Facts or Fancies, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 171, 174 n.25 (1984). Al- 
though Sanford Levinson approves of the Brown result, he acknowledges that i t  
"cannot plausibly be thought to derive in its entirety from the unamended Consti- 
tution itself, and judicial supremacy in the absence of such derivation does contin- 
ue to exhibit overtones of Platonic guardianship." Sanford Levinson, T h  Turn To- 
ward Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 567, 578 
(1983). Mark Tushnet observed that the legislative history "leads one to conclude 
that school segregation is not unconstitutional," that were we to ask the Framers 
"whether the amendment outlawed segregation in public schools, they would an- 
swer 'No.' " Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules h i d  Down: A Critique of 
Interpretiuism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983); see also 
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55 (1958). 
23. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 137. Racism remains "the still crippling disease 
of American life." ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 14 
(1992). Tom Wicker, liberal columnist, observed, "[Tlhe attitudes between the races, 
the fear and animosity that exist today, are greater than, let us say, at  the time 
of the Brown case, the famous school desegregation decision in 1954." Opinions 
Considered: A Talk with Tom Wicker, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, 8 4, at 4. 
24. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
25. In his Farewell Address, Washington warned the people to correct the Con- 
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and Madison2? to honor the process for change Article V lays 
down, nor the Supreme Court's "[ilt is not the function of courts 
or legislative bodies . . . to alter the method [for change] which 
the Constitution has fixed,"28 count for anything with 
A~kerman.~' On the other hand, Justice Harlan declared, 
'When the Court disregards the express intent and understand- 
ing of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political 
process to which the amending power was committed, and it 
has violated the constitutional structure which is its highest 
duty to protect."30 
Despite his emphasis on the need "to discover meaning in 
our constitutional history,"31 when it comes to specifics 
Ackerman turns his back on constitutional history.32 This is 
abundantly apparent from his treatment of "privileges or im- 
munities" and the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. My 
purposes are to vindicate contested truth and demonstrate that 
any indictment concerning a lack of "basic reliability" is to be 
laid a t  his door, not mine. In weighing a work heralded as the 
"most important project now underway in the field of constitu- 
tional theory," "basic reliability" is of the essence. ' 
My Government by Judiciary (1977):~ which marshalled 
the evidence against judicial transformation of the Fourteenth 
stitution "by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let 
there be no change by usurpation for . . . it is the customary weapon by which 
free governments are destroyed." George Washington, Farewell Address, in 35 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940). 
26. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
27. In the First Congress, Madison said, "sovereignty of the people" means "the 
people can change the Constitution if they please; but while the Constitution ex- 
ists, they must conform themselves to its dictates." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 739 (Jo- 
seph Gales ed., 1789) (running head "History of Congress"). 
28. Hawke v. Smith, 253 US. 221, 227 (1920); see also supra note 16. Chief 
Justice Marshall stated that if the Constitution is not "unchangeable by ordinary 
means . . . then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the peo- 
ple, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable." Marbury v. Madison, 5 US. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
29. But see STORY, supra note 16; PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE 
CONSTITZJTION 7 (1978); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-49 
(1905). 
30. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
31. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 36. "History for the activist is a protean in- 
strument, useful for legitimating a predetermined result." LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDG- 
MENTS: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 78 (1972). 
32. See infi-a note 76. 
33. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT RY JLJDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION F THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
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Amendment, prompted Ackerman at  this late date to attack my 
"bad history,"34 expatiating at length: 
By '%ad," I mean really bad. One example should be enough 
to encourage you to treat Berger's use of sources with extreme 
caution. Given Berger's premises, Justice Washington's fa- 
mous opinion in Cofield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1823) (No.3230) is a matter of great importance. As 
Berger recognizes, Washington's definition of "privileges and 
immunities" was quoted repeatedly by partisans to define the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. I t  is therefore under- 
standable that Berger wishes to establish that Washington's 
opinion is consistent with his own view of the amendment as  
a superstatute, constitutionalizing only a fixed list of rights 
previously enacted in the Civil Rights Act. Unfortunately, 
Berger achieves this end by selective quotation and 
italicization so egregious that i t  shakes confidence in his basic 
reliability. . . . Berger conceals from the reader by the simple 
expedient of replacing Washington's words with ellipses . . . . 
. . . I am concerned with Berger's basic ethics as  an histo- 
rian . . . . 
I am also troubled by Berger's use of italics to suggest 
that Washington is emphasizing the limited character of his 
construction of "privileges and immunities"-when in the 
excised portion of the text he explicitly endorses a more ex- 
pansive interpretation. This kind of shoddy work on a source 
as crucial as Corfield is inexcusable. 
[Elven by the standards of lawyers' history, [Berger's 
Government by Judiciary] seems exceptionally tendentious in 
its treatment of the sources.35 
So my use of italics, and of ellipses t o  avoid overlong quota- 
tions, becomes at  Ackerman's hands something sinister, "inex- 
34. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 91. In 1983 Richard Saphire wrote, 
"[Rlesponding to Berger's thesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry in 
constitutional scholarship." Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the 
Constitution, 8 U .  DAYTON L. REV. 745, 753 (1983). "The magnitude and furor of 
the scholarly response to &vernment by Judiciary reveals that Mr. Berger has 
touched sensitive academic nerves." Wallace Mendelson, Ruoul Berger on the Four- 
teenth Amendment Corno Copia, 3 BENCHMARK 205, 211 (1987). To borrow from 
Eric Foner in another context, my thesis "remains important precisely because a 
generation of scholars has directed its energies to overturning it." Eric Foner, The 
Slaveholder as Factory Owner, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW, May 23, 1982, at 11, 27. 
35. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 334-36 n.21. But cf. infra note 76. The eminent 
historiographer Peter Gay wrote that historical writing "seems tendentious to those 
who reject it." 1 PETER GAY & GERALD CAVANAUGH, ISTORIANS AT WORK at ix 
(1972). 
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cusable." This charge of concealment is deflated by my quota- 
tion of the entire passage, without ellipsis, in The Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Bill of Rights,S6 thus countering an impli- 
cation of sinister suppression. In any event, i t  is shoddy 
scholarship to convert what might be regarded as a mere differ- 
ence of opinion respecting an item of evidence into an "exci- 
sion," a "concealment" designed to mislead the reader, betray- 
ing a lack of "basic ethics as an historian." This recalls a con- 
temptible Communist tactic: it  does not suffice to refute an 
opponent,37 he must be forever discredited. * 
Corfield v. Coryell is but one of thousands of facts detailed 
in my book.38 It  bears solely on "privileges and immunities," 
and it is but one fragment in a mosaic composed of many pieces 
of evidence which prove its limited compass. What need was 
there for me to misrepresent this one fragment when the rest 
of the evidence sustains my conclusion as to the scope of "privi- 
leges and immunities"-evidence which Ackerman resolutely 
disregards? Here are the facts. 
I. "PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES" 
The words "privileges and immunities" are first met in 
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation: "the people of the 
36. RAOLJL BERGER, THE FOU~TEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 34 
(1989). Ackerman's scholarly manners might be improved were he to ponder on 
Lino Graglia's urbane mere mention of Judge Richard Posner's "lengthy quotation 
from Bork's book which omits, without indication, a sentence that flatly contradicts 
the charge." Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1038 (1992). 
37. "[Judge Richard] Posner agrees with [Robert] Bork that there is a . . . 
6 Y new class" . . . of left-liberal academics . . . predominant in American 
Universities' "; and Professor Graglia places Ackerman in that class. Graglia, supm 
note 36, at  1049, 1022 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 1365, 1381 (1990) (book review)). Paul Brest, a leading activist, pleaded 
with his fellows "simply to acknowledge that most of our writings are not political 
theory but advocacy scholarship designed to persuade the Court to adopt our vari- 
ous notions of the public good." Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controver'y: 
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 
(1981). My studies stand athwart such advocacy and therefore became the butt of 
activist obloquy. 
38. In a review of RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987), 
Michael M c C o ~ e l l  noted that Berger, by a "relentless collation" of quotations from 
the Founders' utterances, demonstrates that "the framers and ratifiers of the Con- 
stitution intended the authority of the states to be far greater, and that of the 
federal government far less, than it has turned out to be." Michael W. McConnell, 
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1485 (1987) 
(emphasis added). 
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different states . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immu- 
nities of free citizens in the several states," specifying "all the 
privileges of trade and commerce."3g For the Founders, the 
enumerated "privileges of trade and commerce" qualified the 
general words "privileges and immunitie~.'"~ The latter were 
picked up by Article IV of the Constitution. Chief Justice White 
stated that they were intended to perpetuate the "limitation of 
the Articles of C~nfederation."~' White repeated Justice 
Miller's statement in the Slaughter-House Cases that "[tlhere 
can be but little question that . . . the privileges and immuni- 
ties intended are the same in each."42 From the beginning the 
Maryland and Massachusetts courts construed Article IV in 
terms of trade and commerce.43 
The words "privileges and immunities" came into the Four- 
teenth Amendment by way of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, 
which referred to "civil rights or immunities.'"* In explaining 
39. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1777), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (Henry S. Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963). 
40. In T k  Federalist, Madison asked, "For what purpose could the enumeration 
of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included 
in the preceding general power?" THE FEDERALIST No. 41, a t  269 (James Madison) 
Modern Library 1937). 
In the 39th Congress, Martin Thayer said of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866: 
"[Wlhen those civil rights which are first referred to in general terms in the bill 
are subsequently enumerated, that enumeration precludes any possibility that the 
general words which have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which 
have been enumerated." THE RECONSTRIJCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 169 (Alfred 
Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter DEBATES]. 
41. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920) (emphasis added). 
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939), explains that Article IV "prevents a State 
from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own." 
42. 254 U.S. at  296 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 
(1872)). 
43. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 23 
Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 91 (1827). Daniel Webster emphasized that Article IV put i t  
beyond the power of any state to hinder entry " 'for the purposes of trade, corn- 
merce, buying and selling.' " DEBATES, supra note 40, at  466 (citation omitted). The 
principal spokesmen and theorists of the abolitionist movement, Lysander Spooner 
and Joel Tiffany, argued that "privileges and immunities" embraced "protection in 
the enjoyment of [a citizen's] personal security, personal liberty, and private prop- 
erty, . . . [and] protection against . . . lawless violence exercised under the forms 
of governmental authority." JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 110 (1965). 
These were the Blackstonian triad, 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 129, 134, 138 (1765-1769), which James Wilson read to the 
39th Congress as defining "civil rights." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 
(1866). He emphasized that the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 
were no "greater than the rights which are included in the general term 'life, liber- 
ty and property.' " Id. at  1295. 
44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866). 
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those words to the Senate, Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, not only read from Corfield 
v. Coryell, but also from the cases from Maryland (per Samuel 
Chase, soon to be elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court) and 
Massach~se t t s .~~  Chase declared that the words were to be 
given a "limited ~pe ra t ion . "~~  It  is an index of Washington's 
"expansive interpretation" in  Corfield-and of t h a t  
interpretation's "great abstraction and ~weep'"~-that he held 
the words did not confer on an out-of-state citizen the privilege 
of dredging for oysters in New Jersey waters! But Washington 
experienced no difficulty in concluding that a sojourner would 
have the right to vote. Disavowing this, Trumbull stated that 
Washington "goes further than the bill under con~ideration.'"~ 
Certainly Trumbull did not read Corfield broadly; he stated 
that it enumerates "the very rights that are set forth in [the 
first section of the] bill," and he explained that "[tlhe great 
fundamental rights set forth" in the bill are "the right to ac- 
quire property, the right to go and come a t  pleasure, the right 
to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit 
and dispose of property.'"g 
Four years after Corfield, in 1827, Chief Justice Parker 
declared on behalf of the Massachusetts court that the "privi- 
leges and immunities" clause confers a "right to sue and be 
sued," that citizens who move to a second State "cannot enjoy 
the right of suffrage [contradicting Washington]" but "may take 
45. DEBATES, supra note 40, at  121-22. 
46. 3 H. & McH. at 554. Chase was 30 years closer to the Founders than Jus- 
tice Washington. 
47. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 335-36 n.21. 
48. DEBATES, supra note 40, at  122. 
49. Id. (emphasis added). Martin Thayer said, the "section goes on to define 
with greater particularity the civil rights and immunities which are to be protected 
by the bill." Id. at  169; see also Thayer's comments, supra note 40. 
Speaking on behalf of four dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice 
Field said that Corfield was "cited by Senator Trumbull with the observation that 
it enumerated the very rights . . . set forth in the first section of the ad ,  . . . 
that these were the great fundamental rights set forth in the act." 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, 98 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). William Windom of Minnesota said that 
the Civil Rights Bill affords blacks "an equal right, nothing more . . . to make and 
enforce contracts [etc.] . . . . I t  merely provides safeguards to  shield them from 
wrong and outrage, and to protect them in the enjoyment of . . . the right to ex- 
ist." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866); see also the Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22, 24, 25 (1883). William Lawrence said in the 39th Congress 
that the Bill provides "that as to certain enumerated civil rights" what "may be 
enjoyed by any shall be shared by all citizens in each State." CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 1832 (1866). 
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and hold real estate."50 If Corfield be read broadly, it was pa- 
tently without influence on the contemporary Massachusetts 
court. Ackerman would attribute to an 1823 opinion the power 
to  expand an 1866 enactment that its spokesman, after quoting 
from Corfield, said enumerated the "very rights" mentioned in 
the bill, something Georgia u. Rachel described as "a limited 
category of rights.'"' Serious scholarship requires cognizance 
of "discrepant" evidence.52 No allusion to the foregoing facts 
appears in the Ackerman indictment. 
Turn now to  the particulars of Ackerman's diatribe, begin- 
ning with his objection to my "use of italics" in quoting from 
Corfield: " 'We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions 
to  those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, 
fundamental . . . .' "53 Ackerman complains that this suggests 
that 'Washington is emphasizing the limited character of his 
construction of 'privileges and immunities'-when in the ex- 
cised portion of the text he explicitly endorses a more expan- 
sive interpretati~n.'"~ An author's italicization reflects his 
judgment of what is significant. Minimally, the italicized "con- 
fined" conflicts with Washington's allegedly "expansive inter- 
pretation." 
Consider the "excised portion." After enumerating the 
rights of property, contracts-and the "elective franchise" re- 
jected by Trumbull-Washington said, 
These, and many others which might be mentioned 
[Ackerman's italics], are, strictly speaking privileges and 
immunities and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each 
state, in every other state, was manifestly calculated (to use 
the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provi- 
sion in the old articles of confederation) "the better to secure 
and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the 
50. Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827). 
51. 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966). In a decision contemporary with the Amendment, 
the Court declared, "[Tlhe Amendment did not add to the privileges and immuni- 
ties of a citizen." Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874). In the 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883), Justice Bradley, a contemporary of the 
Civil Rights Bill of 1866, declared that it undertook to secure "the same right t o  
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, . . . and to inherit, purchase . . . 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . . Congress did not assume . . . to 
adjust what may be called the social rights of men . . . ." See also infra note 98. 
52. HERBERT BUITERFIELD, GEORGE IU AND THE HISTORIANS 225 (1959). 
53. BERGER, supra note 33, at 31 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 
551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)). 
54. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 335-36 n.21. 
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people of the different states of the Union." But we cannot 
accede to the proposition . . . that . . . the citizens of the sever- 
al states are permitted to participate in all [emphasis not in 
original] the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of 
any other particular state.55 
Not only is there an internal contradiction between "confined" 
to "fundamental rights" and "many others," but rejection of 
"all" local rights undermines an "expansive interpretation." 
Then too, Washington's reference to the "corresponding" Article 
IV of the Articles of Confederation, which was limited to "trade 
and commerce," is a t  war with the "expansive" content which 
Ackerman espies. It was altogether reasonable to infer from 
these facts that Corfield may not be read to expand the "funda- 
mental rights" enumerated by T r u m b ~ l l . ~ ~  
11. THE SCOPE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Let me turn to another major example of Ackerman's indif- 
ference to unpalatable facts. On Berger's view, he states, 
the Fourteenth Amendment.. . had a very narrow aim: to 
constitutionalize the rules contained in a single statute, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, that the Reconstruction Congress 
had enacted into law a few months earlier. Unfortunately for 
Berger, the text of the amendment does not even mention this 
act; nor does it . . . affirmatively state, in relatively clear and 
operat ional  t e rms ,  t h e  ru les  t h a t  i t  wishes to 
constit~tionalize.~~ 
My "belief" that "the People enacted a superstatute [his jargon] 
that  changed the Constitution only in the precise ways enumer- 
ated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"~~ he dismisses as "false 
55. Id. a t  335 11.21 (quoting CorfWId, 6 F. Cas. at  552) (Ackerman's brackets 
omitted). 
56. Of Ackerman, one may say what Julius Goebel wrote of William Crosskey: 
"Coming to his task with a new axe to grind [he] has seemingly forsworn all can- 
ons of objectivity to  make himself a grindstone to suit his purposes." Julius Goebel, 
Jr., Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 451 (1954). Robert Jastrow observed 
that "when our beliefs are in conflict with the evidence," "[wle become irritated." 
Robert Jastrow, Have the Astronomers Found God?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1978, $ 6 
(Magazine) at  18, 19. Richard Kay wrote that the desegregation and reapportion- 
ment decisions "have now become almost second nature to a generation of lawyers 
and scholars. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the casting of a fundamental doubt 
on such basic assumptions should produce shock, dismay, and sometimes anger." 
Richard S. Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REV. 801 (1978). 
57. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at  91. 
58. Id. at  92. Ackerman charges that I have "trivialized Time Two [the Recon- 
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to the historical character of Republican Reconstructi~n."~~ 
Ackerman ignores what Chief Justice Marshall called "the 
most sacred rule of interpretation," resort to the "intention."' 
Summarizing the common law in 1736, Matthew Bacon stated, 
"Everything which is within the Intention of the Makers of a 
Statute is, although it be not within the Letter thereof, as 
much within the statute as that which is within the Letter? 
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment made clear that we 
were to be guided by their intention. 
Senator Charles Sumner, arch-protagonist of all-out 
antidiscrimination, said that if the meaning of the Constitution 
"in any place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem 
to have no fixed signification [e.g., equal protection], we cannot 
err if we turn to the framers."62 His view was shared by con- 
freres in the 39th Congress. In 1871, John Farnsworth said of 
the Amendment, "Let us see what was understood to be its 
meaning at the time of its adoption by Congress . . . ."63 
James Garfield, later the martyred president, rejected an inter- 
pretation that went "far beyond the intent and meaning of 
those who framed and those who amended the Con~titution."~~ 
These sentiments found powerfiil confirmation in 1872 by a 
unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee Report, signed by 
Senators who had voted for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments: 
In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it 
struction era] by characterizing its constitutional amendments as superstatutes." Id. 
at  91. The characterization is his, not mine. I am comfortable with the existing 
scholarly vocabulary. 
59. Id. at 92. 
60. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland 167 (Gerald Gunther 
ed., 1969). Ackerman is willing to use "intent of the Framers" so long as it is 
confined to the "intentions of the People," not the "small number of 'Framers' who 
proposed the Constitution." ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 88 & footnote. As I will 
demonstrate, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated that their 
debates would be consulted. 
61. 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABMDGMENT OF THE b w  647-48 (3d ed. 1768); 
see also Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903). When a legislature "has 
intimated its will, however indirectly," Justice Holmes said, "that will should be 
recognized and obeyed . . . . [Ilt is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to 
say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it . . . ." Johnson v. 
United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). 
62. CONG. GLORE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866). 
63. DEBATES, supra note 40, at 506. For additional citations, see BERGER, supra 
note 36, a t  137-38. 
64. DERATES, supra note 40, at  528. 
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such interpretation as will secure the result which was in- 
tended to be accomplished by those who framed it and the 
people who adopted it. . . . 
. . . A construction which should give the phrase . . . a 
meaning differing from the sense in which it was understood 
and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitu- 
tion, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the 
plain and express language of the Constitution . . . . This is 
the rule of interpretation adopted by all commentators on the 
Constitution, and in all judicial expositions of that instrument 
65 
. . . .  
Now for some uncontroverted proof that the framers 
deemed the Bill and section one of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to  be identical. George Latharn stated that "the 'civil rights 
bill,' which is now a law, . . . covers exactly the same ground as 
this a~nendment."~ Martin Thayer said, "[Ilt is but incorpo- 
rating in the Constitution of the United States the principle of 
the civil rights bill which has lately become a law . . . . n67 An 
early activist, Howard Jay Graham, wrote that "[vlirtually 
every speaker in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendments 
[sic]-Republicans and Democrats alike-said or agreed that 
the Amendment was designed to  embody or incorporate the 
Civil Rights Act."6s Horace Flack, a broad constructionist of 
the Amendment wrote, "[Nlearly all said that it was but an 
incorporation of the Civil Rights Bill . . . . [Tlhere was no con- 
troversy or misunderstanding as to  its purpose and mean- 
ing."' More recently Charles Fairman wrote, "Over and over 
in this debate [on the Amendment] the correspondence between 
Section I of the Amendment and the Civil Rights Act is noted. 
The provisions of the one are treated as though they were es- 
sentially identical with those of the other."70 And Justice 
Bradley, a contemporary of the Amendment, declared that "the 
fxst section of the bill covers the same ground as the four- 
teenth a~nendment."~' 
65. Id. at 571. 
66. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866). 
67. DEBATES, supra note 40, at 213. 
68. HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 291 11.73 (1968). 
69. HORACE FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81 (1908). 
70. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 44 (1949). 
71. Live-stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing & 
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408). 
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On the ratification trail in August 1866, Senator Trumbull 
"clearly and unhesitatingly declared [section one of the Amend- 
ment] to be 'a reiteration of the rights as set forth in the Civil 
Rights Bill.' "" Indiana Senator Lane "affirmed Trumbulrs 
statement concerning the first section," and Senator Sherman 
of Ohio endorsed those views in a speech on September 29, 
1866 .~~  Senator Poland of Maine spoke to the same effect in  
November 1866 .~~  In sum, Joseph James concluded, "state- 
ments of congressmen before their constituents definitely iden- 
tify the provisions of the first section of the amendment with 
those of the Civil Rights  ill."^^ Ackerman's neglect to com- 
ment on this history,76 spread before him in my writings, 
speaks volumes. 
"For correctives" to my "exceptionally tendentious . . . 
treatment of the sources" he cites Jacobus tenBroek, William 
Nelson, and Michael cur ti^,'^ without noting my painstaking 
critiques of t e n B r ~ e k ~ ~  and Nelson,7g or Forrest McDonald's 
judgment that my refutation of Curtis is "utterly devastat- 
ing."80 So too, he ignores Henry Monaghan's statement that  
"Berger's uncomfortable and unfashionable analysis is an im- 
portant one. It will not do, as some have already done, to brush 
it aside in a peremptory manner."81 Sanford Levinson wrote, 
"[Ilt is naive to pretend that . . . we can so easily shed the view 
72. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 161 
(1965) (citation omitted). 
73. Id. at  162, 164. 
74. MICHAEL K. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE THE FOURTEENTH AMEND- 
MENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 252 n.46 (1986). 
75. JAMES, supra note 72, at 179. 
76. Sherry states that "Ackerman tends to ignore the historical context." Sher- 
ry, supra note 7, a t  926. She also criticizes his "exclusion of the massive historical 
evidence from the Philadelphia Convention, the ratifying conventions," etc. His 
"decision to ignore i t  makes for poor history indeed. What he produces is not even 
'law office history,' because it ignores a tremendous amount of both favorable and 
unfavorable evidence and thus can hardly be considered history at all." Id. at  924- 
25. Compare this with Ackerman's charge that I am guilty of "bad history." See 
supra text accompanying note 31. 
77. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at  336 11.21. 
78. BERGER, supm note 33, at 177-83, 188-90; see also id. at 473 (index refer- 
ence to "tenBroekn). 
79. Raoul Berger, Fantasizing About the Fourteenth Amendment: A Review Es- 
say, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1043 (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: FROM POL~ICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICLAL DOCTRINE (1988)). 
80. Forrest McDonald, How the Fourteenth Amendment Repealed the Constitu- 
tion, CHRONICLES, Oct. 1989, at  29, 31. 
81. Henry P. Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Haruard, 13 C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 117, 124 (1978). 
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of the Constitution, and its limits, articulated by Berger."" 
My Government by Judiciary won praise from Willard 
H ~ r s t , ~ ~  Philip K ~ r l a n d , ~ ~  Forrest and C. Vann 
Woodward:' scholars of higher stature than Curtis and Nel- 
son?? What sort of scholarship is it that prefers the testimony 
of a tyro like Curtis to that of renowned scholars?88 
Ackerman charges that I have "trivialized [the Reconstruc- 
tion era] by characterizing its constitutional amendments as 
super statute^.'"^ "Superstatutes" is his characterization, not 
mine. Let me set forth still other historical facts that demon- 
strate the framers' narrow aim. Late in the discussion of the 
Amendment, Senator James Patterson, who voted for it, de- 
clared, "[I] am opposed to any law discriminating against 
[blacks] in  the security and protection of life, liberty, person, 
property, and the proceeds of their labor . . . . Beyond this I am 
not prepared to go."g0 Such remarks arose from the "commit- 
ment to traditional state-federal  relation^,"^^ so that Alfred 
82. Sanford Levinson, Wrong But Lqal?, 236 NATION 248, 250 (Feb. 26, 1983) 
(book review). 
83. "This is a major piece of work, and a very illuminating one." Willard Hurst, 
Dust Jacket to BERGER, supra note 33. 
84. Philip Kurland wrote that Government by Judiciary "reflects a deep scholar- 
ship . . . and an ardent plea for intellectual honesty." Phillip B. Kurland, Foreword 
to RAOIJL BERGER, SELECTED WRITINGS ON CONSTITIJTIONAL LAW at  i, vi (1987). 
85. Forrest McDonald regards Government by Judiciary as "indispensable," "de- 
finitive," "prodigious research," and comments that my "work was herculean, bril- 
liant, and irrehtable." McDonald, supra note 80, at  29-31. 
86. "Raoul Berger's Government by Judiciary raises scores of fascinating ques- 
tions that no one in the field can afford to ignore." C. V ~ M  Woodward, Dust Jack- 
et to BERGER, supra note 33. Jacobus tenBroek, an early neo-abolitionist, wrote 
that the principal spokesmen and theorists of the abolitionist movement, Lysander 
Spooner and Joel Tiffany, regarded "privileges and immunities" as a right to "hll 
and ample protection in the enjoyment of [the blacks'] personal security, personal 
liberty, and private property, . . . protection against . . . oppression . . . [and] 
against lawless violence." TENBROEK, supra note 43, at  110. Those like William 
Nelson, who invoke abolitionist theorizing for reading their social aspirations into 
the Fourteenth Amendment, go beyond their leading spokesmen. See Berger, supra 
note 79. 
87. Such neophytes are transformed by the activists into "authorities" on the 
adage "any stick to beat a dog." 
88. Writing to Justice Holmes, Harold Laski considered it a just criticism that 
a writer "has no sense of the proportionate value of his authorities." Letter from 
Harold J .  Laski to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (Jan. 6, 1934), in 2 HOLMES- 
LASKI L ~ E W  1463 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953). Philip Kurland wrote, "Berger's 
touchstone has been the text of the Constitution in light of the history of its ori- 
gins. It is this stance that has made him anathema to so many of our sitting 
professors of constitutional law and political science." Kurland, supra note 84, at i. 
89. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 91. 
90. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2699 (1866). 
91. Alfred H. Kelly, Comment on Harold M. Hyman's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS 
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Kelly-who helped the NAACP prepare the desegregation 
case-stated, "the radical Negro reform program could be only 
a very limited one."92 Justice Harlan justly described as "irre- 
futable and still unanswered"93 the evidence that suffrage, the 
quintessential right, was excluded from the ambit of the 
amendment.94 Time and again proposals to bar all forms of 
discrimination were reje~ted.'~ 
Then there is a remarkable incident on which no activist, 
Ackerman included, has seen fit to comment. John Bingham, 
draftsman of the Amendment, vehemently objected to the "op- 
pressive" words "civil rights" in the Civil Rights Bill because 
they would reach racial discrimination "in any of the civil 
rights of the citizen," and would "reform the whole civil and 
OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 55 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1966). Hyman noted 
Republican "unwillingness to travel . . . any road more rugged than the Civil 
Rights-Freedmen's Bureau extension-Fourteenth Amendment route that left the 
states masters of their fates." HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 470 
(1973). Philip Paludan repeatedly emphasized that attachment to federalism-State 
control of local institutions-was "the most potent institutional obstacle to the 
Negroes' hope for protected liberty." PHILIP S. PALIJDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 
15, 31, 51, 54 (1975). Justice Brandeis declared that the Constitution "preserves 
the autonomy and independence of the States." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 78 (1938). For additional citations, see BERGER, supra note 33, a t  50-51. 
92. Kelly, supra note 91, at  55 (emphasis added). 
93. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
94. Senator Sumner regarded suffrage as "the only sufficient guarantee," with- 
out which the Fourteenth Amendment was inadequate to protect the blacks in 
anything. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 685 (1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, 
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869). Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo, dissenting 
in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 443 (1935), rested on solid ground when they 
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "created no new privileges and immunities 
of United States citizenship." 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that if suffrage is denied on 
acmunt of race, the State's representation in the House of Representatives shall be 
proportionately reduced. Senator Fessenden, Chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction, explained that the Amendment "leaves the power where it is; but 
tells them [the States] most distinctly, if you exercise that power wronghlly, such 
and such consequences will follow." DEBATES, supra note 40, at  143. Senator 
Howard observed, "[Tlhe States retain the power . . . of regulating the right of suf- 
frage in the States. . . . [Tlhe theory of this whole amendment is, to leave the 
power of regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of the States, and 
not to assume to regulate it . . . ." Id. at 237. John Bingham stated, "The amend- 
ment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulat- 
ing suffrage in the several States." Id. at 217. The Joint Committee commended 
Section 2 because it "would leave the whole question with the people of each 
State." Id. at  94. 
95. BERGER, supra note 33, at  163-64. 
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criminal code of every State g~vernment."~~ His expostulation 
led to  the deletion of "civil rights or immunities." James Wil- 
son, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, explained 
that this deletion was accomplished in order to afford no 
ground "for a latitudinarian construction not intended," and to 
bar any construction going "beyond the specific rights named in 
the se~tion."~' Why, I call upon Ackerman to explain, did 
Bingham, after vigorously protesting against the "oppressive" 
scope of "civd rights" in the Bill, switch to that very breadth in 
the "privileges or immunities" of the Amendment? It is more 
reasonable to conclude that "privileges and immunities" had 
become words of art having limited meaning.gg On this score, 
lastly, the two leaders, Thaddeus Stevens and Senator 
Fessenden, confessed that the Amendment had fallen short of 
their hopes. Stevens settled for less notwithstanding his hope 
that the people "would have so remodeled all our institutions 
as to  have freed them from every vestige of. . . inequality of 
rights . . . . that no distinction would be tolerated . . . . This 
bright dream has vanished. . . . [W]e shall be obliged to  be 
content with patching up the worst portions of the ancient 
edifice . . . ."" 
Fessenden also recognized that "we cannot put into the 
Constitution, owing to  existing prejudices and existing institu- 
96. DEBATES, supra note 40, a t  186, 188 (emphasis added). 
97. Id. at  191. Alexander Bickel considered that the Binghafl i lson deletion 
"conclusively validated" the view that "the [Civil Rights] Bill dealt only with a 
distinct and limited set of rights." Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique 
of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV 651, 685 n.165 (1979); see also Raoul 
Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C. L. REV. 427 (1981). 
98. After reading the judicial constructions t o  the Senate, Trumbull noted, "this 
being the construdion as settled by judicial decisions." DEBATES, supra note 40, at  
122. And William Lawrence "concede[d] that the courts have by construction limit- 
ed the words fall privileges' to mean only 'some privileges.' " Id. a t  207. In a simi- 
lar context the Supreme Court said, "[Wle should not assume that Congress . . . 
used the words . . . in their ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already 
been construed as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation." Yates 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) (emphasis added); see also United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693) (Marshall, C.J.). 
Bingham himself concurred in a limited meaning. On January 30, 1871, he 
submitted a Report of the House Judiciary Committee reciting that the privileges 
or immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment refer to none "other than those privi- 
leges and immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article 4, 
section 2. The fourteenth amendment . . . did not add to the privileges or immuni- 
ties before mentioned . . . ." DEBATES, supra note 40, at 466; see also supra note 
5 1. 
99. DEBATES, supra note 40, at  237. 
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tions [racism and states' rights], an entire exclusion of all class 
 distinction^."'^^ Ackerman's total disregard of the facts herein 
detailed is far more incompatible with scholarly integrity than 
my italicization and use of ellipses. 
This does not exhaust Ackerman's disregard of historical 
facts, his straining after "fancy theor[ies]" which confessedly 
have no appeal to  "lawyer or judge,"lO' and which pepper his 
pages. To compare them with the facts would be to  pad this 
article with cumulative evidence that would weary the reader. 
Instead I have followed his example: "One example should be 
enough to encourage you to treat Berger's use of sources with 
extreme caution."'02 He seized on a solitary evidentiary detail 
for a reading that is countered by all of the other facts. I have 
rebutted his sweeping allegations by marshalling incontrovert- 
ible evidence on two central issues: (1) the scope of "privileges 
and immunities" and (2) the identity of the Civil Rights Act 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Why do I dwell on the importance of constitutional history? 
Justice Horace Gray, himself no mean historian, considered 
that "all questions of constitutional construction" were "largely 
. . . historical  question[^]."'^^ That follows from considerations 
of enduring importance. Ours is a government founded on the 
consent of the governed. 'The people," declared James Iredell, 
one of the ablest of the Founders, "have chosen to be governed 
under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be 
governed, or promised to submit, upon any other. . . ."'* Any 
light upon the scope of their consent, what they sought to ac- 
complish, is therefore of utmost importance. Gripped by fear of 
the greedy expansiveness of power, the Framers steered by a 
basic principle to  crib and confine all delegated power.'05 
100. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866). 
101. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 17. 
102. Id. at  334 n.21. 
103. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 169 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting). After 
commenting on Gray's dissent, Mark DeWolfe Howe observed, "There can be no 
question but that he made important contributions to knowledge of the legal past 
in a number of his judicial opinions." 2 MARK D. HOWE, JUSTICE OWER WENDELL 
HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882, a t  116 (1963). Gray "was quite properly 
conceived to be a legal historian of exceptional competence." Id. 
104. 2 GEORGE J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 
(1949). 
105. Bernard Bailyn tells us that the colonists interminably dwelt on power's 
"endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries." BER- 
NARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56 (1967); 
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
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Words were employed to keep the delegates from "mischief," 
Jefferson declared, by the "chains of the Constit~tion."'~~ 
Hence a written Constitution is subverted by a theory that 
frees the justices to jettison the meaning attached by the Fram- 
ers to their words in favor of the justices' own. 
In a review of my Government by Judiciary in the London 
Times, Max-now Lord-Beloff, an Oxford emeritus and long- 
time student of American constitutionalism, wrote, "The quite 
extraordinary contortions that have gone into proving the con- 
trary make sad reading for those impressed by the high quality 
of American legal-historical s~holarship."'~' Ackerman has 
added an even more extraordinary chapter to such "scholar- 
ship." 
1%. 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
A D O ~ I O N  OF THE FEDERAL C O N ~ I O N  440 (1836). 
107. Max Beloff, Arbiters of America's Destiny, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPP. (Lon- 
don), Apr. 7, 1978, at 11. 
